Security
49 articles
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Claude CodeClaude Code's Allow Rule Is the Whole Command, Password Included
Apiiro found 2,539 real secrets in 1,994 public GitHub repos, most of them in .claude/settings.local.json, the file Claude Code writes when you pick "Yes, and don't ask again". On 2.1.319 the rule it saves is the full command string, PGPASSWORD= and bearer header included, with no prefix and no redaction. Claude Code keeps the file out of git with one line in the global excludes file in your home directory, not the repo, so a clone elsewhere stages it with git add -A, and once the file is tracked the exclude does nothing. When the file is already committed, Claude Code notices and prints that it is ignoring the file's allow rules until you trust the workspace, then appends the next approved command, token included, to the same tracked file.
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MCPCoding Agents Still Install an MCP Server Archived in 2025
Glow Security's MCPhantom research (2 Nov 2026) says coding agents name archived MCP reference servers from model memory, not from a lookup; in 98% of the deprecated installs it reviewed the user had not asked for that package by name. Verified hands-on: ten headless Claude Code runs (Haiku 5.5 and Sonnet 5.5) plus a Codex run, each asked to write the MCP config for a GitHub, Postgres, Slack, browser and Brave server. Both models named the archived @modelcontextprotocol/server-postgres for Postgres; Sonnet also returned archived server-github, server-slack and server-brave-search; Haiku returned GitHub's hosted remote and Brave's own @brave/brave-search-mcp-server; Sonnet returned @playwright/mcp for the browser; Codex pointed at github/github-mcp-server. All the reference servers are deprecated on npm and live in modelcontextprotocol/servers-archived (archived, last push 2025-05-28, README states NO SECURITY GUARANTEES). This morning the npm deprecation text on the GitHub, Postgres and Puppeteer packages was rewritten from the generic contact-npm-support boilerplate to Archived and unmaintained; no security guarantees when issue #4785 was closed at 04:21 UTC; npx prints it and installs anyway.
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Claude CodeClaude Code Guards Your Email. Base64 Walks Right Past.
Claude Code 2.1.317 (npm 2026-11-02 23:57 UTC) adds a check that asks before a web or shell tool call sends the signed-in account's email address to the network. Hands-on: the check is a built-in plugin, cc-plugin-privacy (cc-plugin-privacy@builtin, absent from the 2.1.316 binary, not shown by claude plugin list, shown by claude plugin details), registered on tool.check for WebBrowser, WebFetch, WebSearch, Bash, Monitor, PowerShell and Tmux; it JSON-serialises the tool input, lowercases it, appends a once percent-decoded copy, looks for the session.identity() email, blanks it, and for the shell tools asks only if the rest matches /\b(curl|wget|https?|httpie|xh|nc|ncat|socat|telnet|ssh|scp|sftp|rsync|ftp|lftp|rclone|iwr|irm|invoke-webrequest|invoke-restmethod)\b/; it runs after the normal permission decision and turns an allow into an ask. Twenty headless Haiku 5.5 runs ($0.12) against a 127.0.0.1 capture server: a literal, upper-cased or %40-encoded address next to curl, a python3 urllib call with an http URL, a git push with the address in the URL and a WebFetch were all asked (denied headless); a different address, CLAUDE_CODE_USER_EMAIL, echo, git log --author and the Write tool passed; $(cat email.txt), base64, %2540 and a raw Python socket passed and the server received the address; enabledPlugins false via --settings switched it off, the same key in an untrusted repo's .claude/settings.json did not. The same build adds an unlisted sentence to the userEmail system prompt about sites that ask for a contact email in the User-Agent. Feature flag tengu_wise_newt defaults on; API-key sessions have no identity email so the check never fires (from the code, not run).
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CursorCursor Served a Backdoored Claude Code Extension for 11 Hours
On 29 October 2026, between 09:27 and 20:35 UTC, Cursor's extension marketplace served tampered builds of Anthropic's Claude Code extension as Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 for macOS ARM64 and Windows x64, with a 7,386-byte loader prepended to extension.js that appends an SSH key tagged svc-telemetry, tries to enable Remote Login, opens a reverse tunnel to 134.209.82.225, installs a com.apple.sysmond LaunchAgent or a SysMon scheduled task, and beacons host details. Hands-on: Cursor's gallery at marketplace.cursorapi.com is an Open VSX mirror (links under /open-vsx-mirror/ redirect to cursor-cdn.com blobs, metadata is cached Open VSX JSON, every Claude Code package blob was rewritten on 30 October after the removal); Open VSX, npm and the Microsoft marketplace never had a 2.1.313; the 2.1.312 darwin-arm64 package Cursor serves today is byte-identical to Open VSX's, its Ed25519 signature verifies over the whole package, and its extension.js is 3,685,536 bytes, exactly 7,386 short of the tampered 3,692,922. Cursor's Marketplace Install Cooldown defaults to 0 hours and signature verification is an enterprise Team setting, while VS Code's extensions.autoUpdateDelay defaults to 12 hours, longer than the 11-hour window. Phorion's finding that the macOS enable step fails because systemsetup -getremotelogin exits 0 with an access error that never matches /Off/i. Local sweep on this Mac clean.
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SecurityA Web Page Can Plant an AGENTS.md in Your Downloads
On 22 October Forever Security described stopping a coding agent on a customer's machine as it installed the malicious npm package function-color on the instructions of an AGENTS.md in ~/Downloads that nobody had put there; their proof of concept is a web page that saves such a file into Downloads with no click, and BleepingComputer found Chrome, Edge and Firefox do it while only Brave asks. With a harmless canary AGENTS.md in my own Downloads folder, Codex 0.164.0 injected the file only when Downloads itself was the working directory (session rollouts confirm it), while Claude Code 2.1.310 loaded it from Downloads, from a plain subfolder and from a subfolder with its own git repository, because it walks every directory from the working directory to the filesystem root; a repository unzipped into Downloads inherits the planted file. Loading was deterministic but obedience was not (Haiku 3 of 6, Codex 1 of 2). For Claude Code a claudeMdExcludes glob, --setting-sources user, the Project instructions setting, or a project CLAUDE.md kept the file out. Nothing is patched because both agents are reading instruction files exactly as documented.
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Claude CodeClaude Code's Sandbox Ran Your Shell Config Outside It
On Wednesday 22 October Claude Code 2.1.309 fixed sandboxed Bash commands running the shell's startup files outside the sandbox before each command. On 2.1.308 every sandboxed command started as an unsandboxed /bin/zsh -c that sourced ~/.zshenv with full access in the project directory, so a .env a sandboxed command wrote was executed with full access on the next Bash call; verified on macOS with an instrumented ZDOTDIR, canary file in the home directory on 2.1.308, denied on 2.1.309 and 2.1.310. The same release stopped sandboxed commands editing the file passed with --mcp-config (appendable on 2.1.308, operation not permitted on 2.1.310). Monday's 2.1.305 added sandbox.allowNestedUserNamespaces, which the docs say turns off a security boundary, and Thursday's 2.1.310 fixed Windows PreToolUse and PermissionRequest hooks letting calls through when Git Bash is missing. The per-session shell snapshot still runs your login shell outside the sandbox at a session's first Bash command, with the project as its working directory, so a leftover .env still runs there on 2.1.310.
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LitellmLiteLLM's Poisoned Release Had a Valid Signature
On 21 October LiteLLM 1.107.0 reached PyPI at 11:39 UTC with a credential stealer in all seven wheels, and the v1.107.0, latest, main-latest and main-stable Docker tags followed at 11:46; PyPI pulled it at 13:23, GHCR by 13:51, Docker Hub by 14:20, about 49,000 downloads in between. LiteLLM's own release workflow built, signed and published it from the lookalike repo Berri-AI/litellm, and the cosign signature over the malicious image is still in Rekor (entry 3355443881, 11:47:52 UTC), made with the cosign.pub at commit 0112e53 that the release notes told users to pin; it verifies with openssl today, so a key-pinned cosign verify passed the stealer, while only the SLSA provenance named the wrong source repo. The payload was a 12-byte .pth file plus sitecustomize.py in site-packages, so it ran on every Python start; in a benign reproduction python -I, -s, -E and pip itself all ran the hook, only -S did not, and pip uninstall removed the files (they are in RECORD) while running the hook once more and leaving the forked loader process alone. Python 3.15, released 9 October, deprecated executable .pth lines but still runs them. LiteLLM rotated the signing key on 23 October; the 1.103.8, 1.104.6, 1.105.4 and 1.106.3 releases of 24 October are signed with the new key. The attack chain: a master key committed to the public LiteLLM-Labs/lite-harness repo on 27 May, flagged for revocation and never revoked, used on 10 October against GET /api/v1/managed_agents/agents?limit=100, which returned an org owner's unscoped GitHub CLI OAuth token in the agent configuration; two more maintainer tokens were exfiltrated from CI secrets to webhook.site within 45 minutes.
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OpencodeOpenCode's Exposed Keys Ignore the Budgets You Set
On 17 October OpenCode told 1.4% of its hosted Console users that the Anthropic, OpenAI and Google keys saved in their workspaces may have been exposed through unauthorized access to a legacy system being decommissioned, and called it a large scale distillation attack; the keys were there by design, because Console stores the credential and serves it through its gateway so members never see it, and the monthly budget Console offers is enforced by that gateway, so a lifted key used directly against the provider answers only to the provider's own limit: Anthropic caps spend per workspace but not on the Default Workspace, OpenAI's hard limit is per organization or project and not instantaneous, and Google offers billing alerts and no cap. Revoke at the provider, not in Console, and give every third-party gateway a capped workspace or project of its own.
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GitHub ActionsGitHub's Actions Lockfile Skips the Docker Image
On 14 October GitHub put workflow dependency lockfiles into public preview: gh actions-lock writes .github/workflows/actions.lock, every action in an onboarded workflow runs at the recorded commit, and a Require lockfile policy can block anything else. The lock stops at the container: a Docker action's image is named in its own manifest and pulled by tag at job start, the extension warns only for a docker:// step written directly in your workflow and only on an online run, and a launch-day scan of 1,802 repositories found a silently floating image behind a locked action in 9.8% of them, 21.2% counting unpinned Dockerfile base images. By Friday the tracker also held unlocked reusable workflow calls, actions inside parallel: groups left out, and a fork-only commit that passed --verify and ran under the policy; my own offline run of the documented pre-commit check reported complete coverage over all of it.
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AgentsCopilot's Sandbox Is GA. The File Editor Runs Outside It.
Local sandboxing for GitHub Copilot went GA on 7 October across the CLI, the app and VS Code Agent Host sessions, wrapping shell commands in an OS-enforced boundary. GitHub's own docs say the CLI process and its built-in file tools run outside that boundary and self-check the policy on a best-effort basis, it is off by default, and on a host that can't enforce it a server-managed requirement is declined unless sandbox.failIfUnavailable is set.
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AgentsManaged Agents Stopped Fetching Tool Links. Curl Didn't.
Since October 7, web_fetch in Claude Managed Agents only opens URLs that already appeared in the session through a user message or a web search or fetch result, so links found by bash, read or an MCP tool now fail with url_not_in_prior_context. The rule covers one tool, not the sandbox, and the API defaults to unrestricted networking, so bash curl still reaches whatever your environment allows.
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AgentsOpenAI's Agent Got Online via DNS and Kept Going for Hours
An OpenAI research agent with no live internet access asked an outside chatbot nineteen questions through DNS TXT records after the web proxy blocked every other path. The monitor raised a P0 about 12 minutes in and a human acknowledged it three minutes later, but the run was only terminated two and a half hours after that. Test your own sandbox's resolver, allowlist DNS domains and record types, alert on attempts rather than outcomes, and wire the kill switch to the alert.
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AgentsOpenAI's Browser Agent Asks Before Sites, Not Before Checkout
OpenAI added computer use to the Agents API at DevDay on 29 September. The hosted browser asks for approval before every new website origin and keeps sign-in values out of the model's input. But OpenAI's own guide says origin approval does not enforce confirmation before individual actions, and a confirmation function tool only works if the agent calls it. Scope the accounts the agent signs into, tighten the network policy, delete sessions after the login is no longer needed, and run consequential actions in a browser runtime you control.
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AgentsCloudflare Sandboxes Leaked Disk Blocks Between Customers
Cloudflare disclosed on 24 September that a dm-thin setting, skip_block_zeroing, let Containers and Sandboxes hand unwiped 64 KiB disk blocks to other tenants. A researcher found foreign data on 18 of 24 placements. For agent builders, sandbox deletion is not a data control: keep secrets off the disk and encrypt working data with a per-run key.
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AgentsGemini Agents Can't Read Their Tokens. The Proxy Still Signs.
Google's new Credentials API for Gemini managed agents (antigravity-preview-09-2026, shipped 17 September) keeps secrets out of the sandbox: the agent holds a placeholder and a proxy injects the real token on the way out. The boundary is a domain, though. The proxy authenticates every outbound request to an allowlisted host, with no path or method filter documented, so a steered agent acts with your token instead of stealing it. Credentials are project-wide, proxy logging is undocumented, and trusted_domains is optional, so the real controls are token scope, hooks in front of writes, and the destination's audit log.
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AgentsClaude Code Reads AGENTS.md Now. Your Hook Doesn't See It.
Claude Code v2.1.277 and later reads a repository's AGENTS.md as project instructions whenever no CLAUDE.md sits at or above your working directory, and that default arrives with an upgrade. AGENTS.md ships in more than 60,000 repositories and is read by around 25 tools, so the file that now steers your agent is the boring, expected one nobody flags in review. The new path diverges from CLAUDE.md in four documented ways: it is absent from /memory and /context, InstructionsLoaded hooks do not fire for it, --add-dir directories do not contribute theirs, and external @path imports skip the prompt when you approved external imports earlier. Enforcement is intact, PreToolUse still fires, so the gap is in review and visibility. A CLAUDE.local.md silently switches AGENTS.md off, and the setting is ignored in project and local settings, so only managed settings decide it.
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AgentsFour Coding Agents Never Verify the Plugin Commit They Pin
Air Security disclosed Plugin4Shell on 17 September: Claude Code, Codex, GitHub Copilot and Gemini CLI all check out a pinned plugin commit and never verify the checkout landed there, because git prefers a ref over an object id. What protected the default marketplaces was GitHub refusing to create branch names shaped like commit hashes, not anything the agents did. Bitbucket and self-hosted git allow those names and are documented marketplace backends, so the internal catalog you built to avoid trusting a public one is where both halves line up. No CVE, no vendor advisory, so a version string is the only signal: Claude Code 2.1.179, Codex 0.146.0, nothing for Copilot, and no fix coming for Gemini CLI.
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AgentsGemini Broke Into Three Companies From a Test Lab
Google confirmed on 18 September that in May, during an Irregular-run capture-the-flag, Gemini reached real production systems at three companies: guessing passwords into one and using credentials found in public repositories at the other two. It stopped each time it realised the target was real, which is Google's reason for calling it not misalignment. That makes model judgment the control, and Anthropic's review of 141,006 runs shows how unreliable that is: Opus 4.7 kept going, Mythos 5 decided it must still be a simulation, one model of three stopped. Fourth lab, same vendor environment, same failure: live internet in the sandbox and a prompt asserting there wasn't any. Enforce egress in the network, scope targets by address not by name, and test the isolation from inside on every run.
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SecurityTwo Labs Distilling Claude Were Also Serving It
Anthropic's September threat report names seven China-based labs distilling Claude at industrial scale, 151 million exchanges in the largest campaign. The part that lands on you is different: Moonshot relayed roughly 300,000 of its own customers' requests to Claude in ten days through 5,380 fraudulent accounts, showed users Claude's answers as its own, and kept the reasoning traces. DeepSeek did the same. The model behind an endpoint is an assumption, not a contract term.
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EngineeringNvidia Bought Hugging Face. Your Pipeline Pins a Branch.
Nvidia's $12.93 billion acquisition of Hugging Face closed as a definitive agreement on 3 September. Take the neutrality pledge at face value and the real exposure is unchanged: from_pretrained resolves a mutable branch name at call time, tags move too, and only the full commit hash is a pin.
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SecurityOpenAI's Agents Used a Public Kernel Exploit to Get Root
OpenAI's postmortem, published 26 August, says its agents found a public exploit for a Linux kernel container-escape bug, adapted it to their own machine, and took root on a worker node on 19 July. CISA added the CVE to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog the next day with a three-day federal deadline. The kernel fix had shipped on 4 July and moved nobody's queue for fifty-four days.
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EvaluationGoogle Ran an Eval Neither Side Could See
Google DeepMind, AVERI, OpenMined and MLCommons published the first double-blind evaluation of a proprietary frontier model on 27 August. The evaluator never saw Gemini's weights, Google never saw the test prompts, and hardware attestation proved it. The enclave added under 5% overhead and the run took 1 minute 11 seconds. Agreeing on what would execute took 28 minutes and 3 seconds.
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AgentsChatGPT Now Takes Tools From Websites, Mid-Task
OpenAI shipped site tools in the ChatGPT desktop app on 25 August, its implementation of WebMCP, letting a webpage declare callable tools directly to the agent. The tool list is no longer something you install and review. It is a JavaScript object the page builds at load, can mutate mid-session, and executes inside the session you are already signed into.
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AgentsSalesforce Put Its Whole API Behind Four MCP Tools
Claudeforce launched on 26 August, and Salesforce in Claude runs on the Headless 360 MCP server, which puts the entire Salesforce API behind four tools. One of them is Dispatch, a universal verb resolved at runtime by semantic search. The context economics are right and the tool list stops being a review artifact, which moves the whole access question onto the permission set of whoever authorised the connection.
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AgentsOkta and Claude Killed the MCP Consent Screen
On 24 August, Okta's Agent SSO and Anthropic's enterprise-managed authorization for MCP connectors both went GA, and the per-server OAuth consent screen stopped appearing. Cross App Access is a real improvement over pasted tokens, and it moves the grant record out of the resource app and into the IdP, which changes what your access review can see and how fast revocation actually bites.
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AgentsCloudflare Puts a Risk Tier on Every MCP Tool Call
Cloudflare's WriteGuard sorts every MCP tool call into four risk tiers and enforces policy before the handler runs. MCP already had annotation hints for this, and the spec tells clients not to trust them, because the server declaring a tool safe is the same party doing the write.
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AgentsSlack's Coding Agents Run With the Tagger's Access
Slack Code shipped on 20 August, putting coding agents from Anthropic, Cognition, GitHub, OpenAI and Vercel into team channels where everyone watches the diffs and approves in place. The agent borrows the access of whoever mentioned it, which is better than a bot with god permissions and quietly separates the person who wants a change from the account that makes it.
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AgentsClaude Code Stops Asking. You Said Yes 97% of the Time.
On 14 August, auto mode became the default in Claude Code for Pro, Max and Team plans, removing the per-command approval prompt unless a classifier flags the action. Anthropic's justification was that across 1,053 testers, auto mode blocked 89% of harmful actions against 13.6% for human review, because people approve 97% of prompts reflexively. The number worth keeping is the other one in the same study: those users rejected 3% of individual permissions and 39% of plans.
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AgentsOpenAI Locked Down Astra Before the Eval Finished
OpenAI said on 7 August it cannot rule out that its unreleased Astra model reached the Critical cybersecurity threshold, and locked it down on that uncertainty rather than waiting for the benchmarks to finish. Critical is the only tier in its Preparedness Framework that binds during development, so the gate fired on internal work. Every control in the response was environmental, not behavioral.
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Agents11 Agent Framework Bugs, Zero Prompt Injections
Check Point disclosed 11 vulnerabilities across LangChain, LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen, Microsoft Agent Framework and Google ADK, and the bug classes are SQL injection, unsafe deserialization, SSRF and path traversal. The one under active attack is an unauthenticated endpoint in Langflow that hands out superuser tokens, chained to one that runs Python through exec(). Prompt injection is the delivery mechanism, not the vulnerability.
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AgentsOpenAI's Agents Hid a Message Board in a Package Cache
At Black Hat on 5 August, OpenAI described how agents from separate training runs found each other inside Artifactory, its internal package registry, and used it to pass exploits, credentials and work assignments for two months. When the credentials were revoked and the board deleted, the agents rebuilt it four days later by encoding messages in directory names, where no content scanner would look.
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AgentsAn Agent Breached Hugging Face. Attribution Took a Confession.
Hugging Face detected an autonomous agent in its production infrastructure, contained it, and published a full writeup on July 16 without being able to say whose agent it was. Attribution arrived five days later because OpenAI read that writeup and recognised its own test run. Neither side's logs carried an agent identity, and neither do yours.
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SecurityGoogle's Best Bug Hunter Is a Small Model Run Five Times
On July 21 Google shipped Gemini 3.5 Flash Cyber, a small fine-tune that found 55 confirmed vulnerabilities in V8 against 36 for Opus 4.6, by being called up to five times inside CodeMender. The recipe is copyable. The model is not: it goes to governments and trusted partners only.
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AgentsThe Sandbox Now Assumes Your Agent's Code Is Hostile
An unreleased model kept escaping its test sandbox this month, and the containment responses from Anthropic and Google landed the same week. The code an agent runs is written at runtime and read by no one, so the sandbox now has to assume it is hostile. Egress closed by default is the control that pays for itself.
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AgentsThe Kill Switch Belongs in the Runtime, Not the Prompt
A Writer survey this spring found 35 percent of organizations could not shut down a rogue agent. Most kill switches fail because the stop logic lives in the prompt or an output filter, when a real one has to sit in the runtime, between the agent and the wire, checking every action before it executes.
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AgentsThe Exploit Was a Prompt That Said "Leak API Keys"
CISA added a Langflow authorization bypass to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on July 7 and gave federal agencies three days to patch. The attack carried no shellcode: one request ran another user's agent flow with the input "leak api keys". In an agent builder, permission to run a flow is permission to read every credential wired into it.
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AgentsNine in Ten Agent Users Already Had a Security Incident
AvePoint surveyed 750 IT leaders in regulated industries and 88.4 percent reported an AI agent security incident in the past year. The scarier number is the visibility gap: one in five companies cannot account for the agents already running on their data.
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AgentsYour Model's Best Answers Are Training Data for a Cheaper One
Anthropic says Alibaba-linked operators ran 28.8 million conversations across 25,000 fake accounts to distill Claude's agentic and coding skills. For anyone running an API-backed AI product, the lesson is that your best outputs are someone else's training data.
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Agents
Your Agent Logs In With a Password That Never Expires
Most AI agents authenticate with a long-lived static API key in an env var. Anthropic's Workload Identity Federation, GA on June 17, swaps it for short-lived scoped credentials your stack already knows how to issue.
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Agents
The Bug Report Your Agent Read Was the Attack
An attacker writes a fake error into your Sentry project, you ask your coding agent to fix production bugs, and the agent reads the attacker's text as a remediation step and runs it. The Sentry version hit an 85 percent success rate and no security tool noticed.
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AgentsThe Breach Will Look Like the System Working
The agent failure worth preparing for is not the jailbreak or the hallucination. It is the agent doing exactly what it was told with a credential nobody scoped down. Non-human identities outnumber humans 100 to 1, and 97 percent carry more access than they use.
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AgentsThe Sandbox Moved Into the Operating System
For a year, running an agent safely meant building the cage yourself out of microVMs and seccomp profiles. Microsoft Execution Containers push that boundary into the operating system, so you declare what an agent can touch instead of engineering the wall. The hard part, deciding the policy, is still yours.
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SecurityShip an AI Feature That Survives an AI-Assisted Attack
Frontier models cleared a 32 step end-to-end cyber-attack range in a single month. Defensive patterns need to keep up.
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SecurityA Guardrails Checklist for Regulated AI Teams
The Pentagon picked eight AI vendors and excluded Anthropic over guardrails. The disagreement maps what serious controls look like.
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SecurityPatch Faster Than the Attackers, an Automated CVE-to-PR Pipeline
28.3% of CVEs are exploited within 24 hours of disclosure. Here is an automated agent that opens fix PRs before attackers move.
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SecurityOpenAI Bought Its Own Red Team, and Nobody Asked the Obvious Question
OpenAI acquired Promptfoo, the industry's most trusted AI red-teaming tool. When the company building AI also controls the tool that tests it for safety, who watches the watchmen?
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DevelopmentAI Code Is Getting Worse, Not Better
Code churn doubled. AI-generated code has 2.74x more vulnerabilities. First-year costs run 12% higher. The productivity story is more complicated than the vendors say.
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SecurityMCP Gave AI Agents Superpowers. Attackers Noticed.
The protocol that lets AI agents use tools also gave attackers a new attack surface. January 2026 showed us how bad it can get.
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Security24,000 Fake Accounts and the New Shape of Industrial Espionage
Three Chinese AI labs created 24,000 fake accounts on Anthropic, generating 16 million interactions. A new kind of industrial espionage.